We study two classes of zero-sum stochastic games with compact action sets and a finite product state space. These two classes assume a communication property on the state spaces of the players. For strongly communicating on one side games, we prove the existence of the uniform value. For weakly communicating on both sides games, we prove that the asymptotic value, and therefore the uniform value, may fail to exist.
Introduction

Problem
In a zero-sum stochastic game, two players interact repeatedly at discrete times, with opposite interests. At each stage, players face a zero-sum game given by the state of nature which evolves according to the current state, and the pair of actions players choose given the history. Therefore, the actions played at each stage impact both the payoff today and the law of the state of nature tomorrow. Players intend to optimize their expected overall payoff. The n-stage repeated and the λ-discounted games are the games in which the overall payoffs are respectively the Cesàro and Abel means of the stage payoffs. Under mild assumptions both games have a value denoted respectively v n and v λ .
A fundamental question arising in the theory of dynamic games is the asymptotic behavior of these values. We shall focus on the two following approaches of this issue. The asymptotic approach studies the convergence of the values of the n-stage repeated game and the λ-discounted game, as n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0, that is as players become more patient. If these quantities converge and are equal, the game is said to have an asymptotic value. The uniform approach is dedicated to the existence, for both players, of strategies that are ε-optimal in every n-stage repeated game, provided that n is large enough. If such strategies exist, players are able to play optimally in every game long enough without knowing the length of the game. In that case, the game is said to have a uniform value. While the existence of the uniform value implies the existence of the asymptotic value, the converse is not true.
The aim of this paper is to study the asymptotic and uniform values in two classes of zero-sum product stochastic games. A product state space is of the form X × Y . Moreover, players control the transitions on their own components of the state space, that is the next state in X only depends on the current state in X and the action of player 1, and similarly for Y . We consider the case where X and Y are finite, and action sets are compact. The two classes we are interested in assume a communication property on the state spaces of the players. These are called the strong and the weak communication properties -the strong communication property implying the weak one.
The first class is the class of strongly communicating on one side zero-sum product stochastic games. In such games, for one player, there exists a fixed time T such that independently of his choice of strategy, there is a positive probability of passing from any state to any other state in his component of the state space in exactly T stages. This assumption, of ergodic nature, implies that the current state of the player having the strong communication property has in the long run little importance.
The second class is the class of weakly communicating on both sides zerosum product stochastic games. In such games, for both players there exists a time T and a strategy such that, for any two states in their components of the state space, they can move from one to the other with positive probability in exactly T stages. Thus players totally control the dynamics on their components of the state space.
Contribution
Strongly communicating on one side and weakly communicating on both sides zero-sum product stochastic games have, to our knowledge, never been studied before.
For strongly communicating on one side games with finite state space and compact action sets, we prove the existence of the uniform value, which does not depend on the initial state of the player having the strong communication property. Furthermore we prove that this player has ε-optimal strategies that have a simple structure. We call them Markov periodic strategies. Under these strategies, the action chosen at each stage does not depend on the whole history but only on the current state and stage modulo the period. Hence they are a particular case of Markov strategies, for which actions chosen depend only on the current state and stage, and are more general than stationary strategies, which only depend on the current state. Our proof is based on a classification of the state space of the player who does not have the strong communication property. This decomposition relies on recurrent classes induced by stationary strategies. It has been introduced for Markov Decision Processes (MDP) by Ross and Varadarajan [18] , similar classifications have been used in Bather [2] , Solan [20] and Flesch et al. [6] . Building on that classification, we consider a family of auxiliary stochastic games and prove that they have a uniform value independent of the initial state. Finally we build an auxiliary MDP for the player who does not have the strong communication property, whose payoffs are the uniform values of the previous auxiliary games. We conclude by proving that the uniform value of the MDP is also the uniform value of the initial game.
Regarding weakly communicating on both sides games with finite state space and compact action sets, we provide an example of a game which does not have an asymptotic value (and hence neither has a uniform one). Our proof is based on a reduction of this example to a simpler game of perfect information with two absorbing and two non absorbing states introduced by Renault [16] . A key element in the non-existence of the asymptotic value is the non semi-algebraic aspect of the action set of one player.
Related literature
Zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [19] in the finite setting (finite state and action sets), for which he proved the existence of the value in the λ-discounted game. Mertens and Neyman [13] proved the existence of the uniform value. Their proof is based on the fact that the value of the λ-discounted game has bounded variations in λ, as shown by Bewley and Kohlberg [3] . It is a key question whether the existence of the uniform value extends to non finite zero-sum stochastic games.
This question has been answered positively for several classes of zerosum stochastic games with a finite state space and non finite action sets, as we consider in this paper. For absorbing games (Mertens et al. [14] ) and recursive games (Li and Sorin [12] ), the proofs use the operator approach of Rosenberg and Sorin [17] that relies on the Shapley operator which entirely contains the dynamics of the game. Still for a finite state space, Bolte et al. [5] showed that games with semi-algebraic (or more generally definable) transitions and actions set have a uniform value. Finally, Renault [15] proved the existence of the uniform value in MDPs with a finite state space and arbitrary action set.
However, in the last few years, several counterexamples to the existence of the asymptotic value in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and compact action sets have been proposed (Vigeral [23] , Sorin and Vigeral [22] and Ziliotto [26] ), ending the long standing idea that such games had an asymptotic value. Laraki and Renault [11] provided such a counterexample with a product state space. All these counterexamples have in common non semi-algebraic transition probability or non semi-algebraic action sets.
Zero-sum stochastic games on a product state space have been introduced by Altman et al. [1] , who examined the case where each player only observes his component of the state and his actions, and showed that these games can be solved by linear programming. Flesch et al. [6, 7] studied equilibria in N -players finite product stochastic games. They however considered an overall payoff which is the limit inferior of the n-stage repeated game payoff, while we are interested in the existence of the uniform value. Finally, Laraki and Renault [11] showed the existence of the asymptotic value in zero-sum product stochastic games under a strong acyclicity condition. This strong acyclicity condition encompasses the irreversibility in the transitions of several classes of repeated games for which the asymptotic value is known to exist. The strong acyclicity condition is incompatible with our weak communication property. It is important to understand in which classes of stochastic games that do not assume an irreversibility condition the asymptotic value may exist.
Gillette [9] introduced games in which independently of the choice of strategies, there is a positive probability of passing from any state to any other state in exactly T stages. He called them cyclic stochastic games. These were also investigated by Hoffman and Karp [10] , Bewley and Kohlberg [4] and Vrieze [24] . A similar assumption has also been examined by Fudenberg and Yamamoto [8] for games where players observe the state and a public signal related to the actions played. However in these articles the property is considered on the whole state space and not only on one component of a product state space.
Organization
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model of zero-sum product stochastic games and recall some elementary facts. In section 3 we give formal definitions of strongly and weakly communicating, and state the two main theorems. Finally, sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to the proofs of the two main theorems.
Preliminaries on zero-sum product stochastic games
Model and course of the game
Let X and Y be two nonempty finite sets. Let A and B be two nonempty compact metric sets endowed with their Borel σ-algebras. Let p : X × A → ∆(X) and q : Y ×B → ∆(Y ), be such that for all x, x ′ ∈ X and all y, y ′ ∈ Y , p(x ′ |x, ·) and q(y ′ |y, ·) are continuous. ∆(X) denotes the set of probability measure over X, and similarly for ∆(Y ). Let u : X × Y × A × B → [0, 1], be such that for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y and all a ∈ A and b ∈ B, u(x, y, ·, b) and u(x, y, a, ·) are continuous.
X is the state space of player 1, Y is the state space of player 2. A is the action set of player 1, B is the action set of player 2. It is without loss of generality that the action sets do not depend on the current state. p is the transition probability of player 1, q is the transition probability of player 2. u is the payoff to player 1.
Let Γ = (X, Y, A, B, p, q, u). The game Γ is played in stages as follows: an initial state (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ X × Y is given and known by the players. Inductively at stage n, knowing the past history h n = (x 1 , y 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , x n−1 , y n−1 , a n−1 , b n−1 , x n , y n ), player 1 and 2 simultaneously choose an action, respectively a n ∈ A and b n ∈ B. A new state x n+1 ∈ X is selected according to the distribution p(·|x n , a n ) on X and a new state y n+1 ∈ Y is selected according to the distribution q(·|y n , b n ) on Y . The payoff to player 1 at stage n is u n = u(x n , y n , a n , b n ).
Strategies
Since the state space of the game Γ is a product of two sets X and Y , we distinguish strategies of the players that only depend on their own history, i.e. on their actions and component of the product state space, from strategies depending on the joint history. We denote strategies and set of strategies depending on the joint history with bold letters.
We denote the set of positive integers by N * . For n ∈ N * , let H 1 n = X × (A×X) n−1 be the set of histories of player 1 at stage n and H 1 ∞ = (A×X) ∞ be the set of infinite histories. H 1 n is endowed with the product σ-algebra H 1 n , and H 1 ∞ with the product σ-algebra H 1 ∞ spanned by n≥1 H 1 n . Let S denote the set of behavior strategies of player 1 depending only on his own history. A strategy σ ∈ S is a sequence (σ n ) n∈N * , where σ n is a measurable map from (H 1 n , H 1 n ) to ∆(A). A strategy σ together with an initial state x ∈ X define a unique probability distribution over H 1 ∞ which we denote P x σ . We define analogous objects for player 2 and denote T the set of behavior strategies of player 1 depending only on his own history.
For n ∈ N * , let
be the set of joint histories at stage n and H ∞ = (A × B × X × Y ) ∞ be the set of infinite joint histories. H n is endowed with the product σ-algebra H n , and H ∞ with the product σ-algebra H ∞ spanned by n≥1 H n . Let S and T denote the sets of behavior strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively. A strategy σ ∈ S is a sequence (σ n ) n∈N * , where σ n is a measurable map from (H n , H n ) to ∆(A), and likewise for T . A pair of strategies (σ, τ ) together with an initial state (x, y) define a unique probability distribution over H ∞ which we denote P x,y σ,τ . A strategy is a Markov strategy if the mixed action played at every stage depends only on the current stage and state. Markov periodic strategies are Markov strategies depending on the stage modulo the period and on the current state. Let us give a formal definition. Definition 2.1. For N ∈ N * , a strategy σ of player 1 is called an N -periodic Markov strategy if there exists (µ n ) n∈{1,...,N } ∈ ∆(A) X×Y ×N such that for all n ∈ N * and all h n = ( x 1 , y 1 , a 1 , b 1 
where n ′ is equal to n modulo N . Markov Nperiodic strategies of player 2 are defined likewise.
Stationary strategies are Markov strategies depending only on the current state, hence they are Markov 1-periodic strategies. Again, stationary strategies on the product state space X × Y (elements of ∆(A) X×Y and ∆(B) X×Y for player 1 and 2 respectively), are denoted with bold letters. Stationary strategies of the players on their components of the state space (elements of ∆(A) X and ∆(B) Y respectively) are denoted with letters that are not bold.
Finally, a pair of stationary strategies (µ, ν)
More generally, a property is said to hold under (µ, ν) if it holds for the Markov chain induced on X × Y . We use similar vocabulary from stationary strategies on X and on Y .
N-stage and λ-discounted games
For all N ∈ N * , the N -stage game Γ N starting in (x, y) ∈ X ×Y , is the game in which the payoff is γ N (σ, τ )(x, y) = 
Moreover, by proposition 5.3 in Sorin [21] , both players have optimal Markov strategies.
For all λ ∈ (0, 1], the λ-discounted game Γ λ starting in (x, y) ∈ X × Y , is the game in which the payoff is
for all (σ, τ ) ∈ S × T . The value of the λ-discounted game starting at (x, y) is denoted v λ (x, y). It is characterized by the following fixed point equation:
If v n and v λ converge as n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0, and the limits are equal, then the game is said to have an asymptotic value. The Tauberian theorem of Ziliotto [25] applies in this setting and the asymptotic value exists if (v λ ) λ∈ (0, 1] converges as λ goes to 0.
Uniform value and optimal strategies
Fix an initial state (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Player 1 is said to uniformly guarantee
And similarly for player 2. If both players guarantee v ∞ , then it is called the uniform value of the game Γ starting at (x, y).
And similarly for player 2.
The next proposition states that if one of the players plays a stationary strategy, then the other player has an ε-optimal best reply which is also stationary. 
Proof. Let ε > 0, µ ∈ ∆(A) X×Y and (x, y) ∈ X × Y . When player 1 plays the stationary strategy µ, player 2 faces a Markov decision process having a uniform value w ∞ , and for which he has a uniformly ε-optimal stationary strategy ν (consult Sorin [21] , corollary 5.26).
Thus, there exists M ∈ N * such that for all N ≥ M one has γ N (µ, ν)(x, y) ≤ w ∞ + ε and for all τ ∈ T one has γ N (µ, τ )(x, y) ≥ w ∞ − ε.
Main results
In the present article, we examine two communication properties on state spaces of the players. In words, a player has the strong communication property if there exists a time T such that independently of his choice of strategy (depending only on his own history), there is a positive probability of moving from any initial state of his component of the state space to any other state in exactly T stages. Definition 3.1. Player 1 has the strong communication property if there exists T ∈ N * such that for all strategies σ ∈ S and all states x, x ′ ∈ X, one has
A similar definition stands for player 2. A game is strongly communicating on one side if either player has the strong communication property.
In words, a player has the weak communication property if there exists a time T and a strategy (depending only on his own history) such that, for any initial state, he can reach any other state in his component of the state space in exactly T stages, with positive probability. Definition 3.2. Player 1 has the weak communication property if there exists T ∈ N * and a strategy σ ∈ S such that for all states x, x ′ ∈ X, one has
A similar definition stands for player 2. A game is weakly communicating on both sides if both players have the weak communication property.
The next simple example illustrates the notions of strong and weak communication.
Example 3.1. In figure 1 below we represent the state space and transition probabilities of player 1. The state space is X = {x, y, z}. Transition probabilities are represented by arrows between states. In state x player 1 chooses α ∈ A. With probability α the next state is x and with probability 1−α it is y. In state y (resp. z) the next state is y (resp. x) with probability 1.
Hence The strong communication property implies the weak one. It is sufficient that one player has the strong communication property for the uniform value to exist, while both players having the weak communicating property does not ensure the existence of the asymptotic value.
The proof of 3.3 relies on a classification of the state space of the player who does not have the strong communication property. We then consider a family of auxiliary stochastic games and prove that they have a uniform value independent of the initial state. Finally we build an auxiliary MDP for the player who does not have the strong communication property, whose payoffs are the uniform values of the previous auxiliary games. We conclude by proving that the uniform value of the MDP is also the uniform value of the initial game.
The proof of 3.4 relies on a counter-example. We show that the Shapley equations of this game are also the Shapley equations of a simpler game with two absorbing and two non absorbing states, for which the asymptotic value does not exist.
Proof of theorem 3.3
We assume in the proof of theorem 3.3 that player 1 has the strong communication property.
In subsection 4.1 we decompose the state space of player 2 in L maximal communicating sets C i (definition 4.1). These sets, forming a partition of Y (proposition 4.2), allow us in subsection 4.2 to introduce L auxiliary stochastic games Γ i having uniform values v i ∞ which do not depend on the initial state (proposition 4.6).
In subsection 4.3 we introduce a Markov Decision Process G for player 2 with the same transition probability q as in the initial stochastic game, but with payoff v i ∞ when the state is in C i . This MDP has a uniform value w ∞ , which is also the uniform value of the initial stochastic game Γ.
In subsection 4.4 we prove that player 2 uniformly guarantees w ∞ in Γ (proposition 4.7). The idea is for player 2 to first player optimally in the MDP G (disregarding player 1) and then to switch to an optimal strategy in one of the games Γ i .
Finally in subsection 4.5 we prove that player 1 uniformly guarantees w ∞ (proposition 4.10). This is one of the main difficulties of the proof. The natural idea is for player 1 to play optimally in each game Γ i . However player 1 does not control the transitions from one C i to another (which may happen infinitely often). We deal with this issue by letting player 2 play a Markov periodic best reply which prevents the state from jumping infinitely often between maximal communicating sets(lemma 4.9). We conclude showing that the payoff this yields can also be obtained by player 2 as a limit payoff in G (proposition 4.10).
Classification of states
The state space Y is classified in a similar way to Ross and Varadarajan [18] , using recurrent classes induced by stationary strategies on Y . Remark 4.1. Player 1 having the strong communication property, there is only one maximal communicating set in X, which is the whole state space X itself. Proposition 4.2 below can be found in Ross and Varadarajan [18] when the action space B is finite, since the proof is similar with a compact action space we omit it. This result, showing that the maximal communicating sets and the set of states that are transient under any stationary strategy form partition of Y , is fundamental in our proof of theorem 3.3 since it allows us (in the next section) to consider independent auxiliary games over each maximal communicating set.
The two examples given bellow allow to show how the state space of player 2 decomposes in maximal communicating sets, and what behavior the state process may have with regard to this decomposition. In particular, they show behaviors of the state process that may happen in that compact action setting and cannot happen in the finite one. represented on the arrows between states, e.g. playing β ∈ B in state y, the next state is x with probability β, y with probability 1 − β − β 2 and z with probability β 2 . The maximal communicating sets are {y} and {z} and the set of transient states under every stationary strategy is {x}.
Figure 2: States, actions and transitions of player 2
Remark that, if the initial state is x, playing β = 1 2n in state y at stage n ≥ 1, player 2 has a positive probability of switching infinitely often between the transient state x and the maximal communicating set {y}. This cannot happen when the action space is finite. In that case, for any strategy of player 2, after finitely many stages the process (Y n ) n≥1 remains forever in one of the maximal communicating sets with probability 1 (see Ross and Varadarajan [18] , lemma 2 and proposition 2).
The next example is derived from the previous one and shows another possible behavior of the state process in the compact action setting. Again, remark that if the initial state is x, playing α = 1/2 in state x and β = 1 2n in state y at stage n ≥ 1, player 2 has a positive probability of switching infinitely often between maximal communicating sets {x} and {y}.
As we mentioned earlier, this behavior the state of player 2 may have gives rise to a difficulty since player 1 cannot control the jumps of player's 2 state between maximal communicating sets or transient states. This difficulty is defused by letting the players play Markov periodic strategies.
Another way of defining maximal communicating sets is via pairs of stationary strategies of player 1 and 2 on X×Y , as in the following definition. Advantageously, maximal communicating sets and joint maximal communicating sets match in following sense. Let us show that X × C i is maximal. Suppose that there exists a subset C of X × Y such that C is a recurrent class under a pair of stationary
and arbitrarily outside C ′ . C ′ is closed under ν and every state in C ′ is accessible from any other state. Hence C ′ is a recurrent class. Thus C ′ ⊆ C i , and
X × C i is the set of transient states.
The auxiliary games over each maximal communicating set
Consider now a family of L zero-sum product stochastic games (Γ i ) i∈{1,...,L} . For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, if y ∈ C i , define the set of actions of player 2 at state y under which the state has probability 1 of staying in C i ,
Remark that the set B y is closed. Then the game Γ i is given by Γ i = (X, C i , A, (B y ) y∈C i , p, q, u) . The sets of strategies for player 1 and player 2 in Γ i are respectively denoted S i and T i . The value of the N -stage game starting at (x, y) ∈ X × C i , is denoted v i N (x, y). In lemma 4.5 and proposition 4.6 below we prove that each of these games have a uniform value that does not depend on the initial state of the game in X × C i .
Lemma 4.5. Let v
Since player 1 has the strong communication property
and since C i is a maximal communicating set
We now fix (x ′ , y ′ ) ∈ X ×C i and let ν ∈ ∆(B) Y and t ≥ T be as in statement (3). We denote ( 
Hence
Thus there exists µ * 1 ∈ ∆(A) such that
Finally there exists µ * 1 ∈ ∆(A) such that
Let k ∈ {2, . . . , t − 1} and suppose there exist µ * 1 ∈ ∆(A) and µ * 2 , . . . ,
Then there exist µ * 1 ∈ ∆(A) and µ * 2 , . . . , µ * k−1 ∈ ∆(A) X such that
Thus there exists µ * k ∈ ∆(A) X such that
Finally,
Thus by induction, there exist µ * 1 ∈ ∆(A) and µ * 2 , . . . , µ * t−1 ∈ ∆(A) X such that for all x 2 , . . . ,
Let us define the strategy σ ∈ S by σ 1 (x * 1 ) = µ * 1 and for all k ∈ {2, . .
Finally σ is defined arbitrarily for all k ≥ t. We have from statement (2) that there exists x * 2 , . . . ,
Since any limit point of (v i N ) N ≥1 is constant over X × C i , we show that players guarantee lim sup N →+∞ v i N by playing an ε-optimal Markov N 0 -periodic strategy for a sufficiently large N 0 . 
Recall that there exists a Markov strategy
Let N = pN i 0 + r, p ≥ 1 and r ≤ N i 0 − 1 be two integers. The following Markov N 0 -periodic strategy is still denoted σ i : at stage n ≥ 1, in state
That is, player 1 uniformly guarantees v i and σ i is an ε-optimal Markov N i 0 -periodic strategy. A similar proof shows that player 2 also uniformly guarantees v i and has an ε-optimal Markov N i 0 -periodic strategy τ i . Note that N i 0 can be taken uniformly over {1, . . . , L} by setting
The auxiliary Markov decision process G
Consider the Markov decision process G = (Y, B, q, g), in which player 2 is the only decision maker and his aim is to minimize
Recall (see Sorin [21] ) that, G has a uniform value w ∞ ∈ [0, 1] Y and that for every ε > 0, player 2 has an ε-optimal stationary strategy.
The interpretation is the following. The objective of player 2 is to reach the maximal communicating set C i with corresponding auxiliary game Γ i having the lowest uniform value v i ∞ possible, and stay in C i . Note that the payoff of 1/2 in D is arbitrary and does not change the value of w ∞ .
We will prove that the uniform value w ∞ of the MDP G is in fact also the uniform value of the initial game Γ. To prove proposition 4.7, we show that player 2 has an ε-optimal strategy which has a rather simple structure: play according to some ε-optimal stationary strategy in G on Y , until reaching a recurrent class of the induced Markov chain on Y . Then switch to an ε-optimal Markov periodic strategy in some game Γ i having the property that the state remains in the corresponding maximal communicating set C i (indeed the ε-optimal strategies used in the proof of proposition 4.7 below can be taken Markov periodic thanks to proposition 4.6).
Player 2 uniformly guarantees
Proof. Let ε > 0, and let ν G be an ε-optimal stationary strategy of player 2 in G. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} define T i = min{n ∈ N * | Y n ∈ R i } to be the hitting time of R i by (Y n ) n∈N * . The minimum over an empty set is taken equal to +∞.
We now consider the game Γ with initial state (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Let us define the strategy τ ∈ T of player 2 as follows. Until there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that the state of player 2 is in R i play ν G . Let n ∈ N * be the first stage at which the state of player 2 reaches one of the recurrent classes R i , i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. From stage n on, play τ ϕ(i) which is an ε-optimal strategy in Γ ϕ(i) .
Let σ be any strategy of player 1 in Γ. Remark that under (σ, τ ), the laws of the T i 's are the same as under ν G .
Since the payoffs u n are at most 1 and T i is at most √ N in the indicator function, (4) is at most
which itself is at most l √ N N which is smaller than ε for N large enough. Remark that in (5),
, hence this quantity is less than or equal to
Recall that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, τ i is ε-optimal in Γ i which has uniform value v i ∞ . For N large enough the quantity above is less than or equal to
because under (σ, τ ), the laws of the T i 's are the same as under ν G . And since ν G is ε-optimal in G,
..,l} T k is less than or equal to w ∞ (y) + ε.
Finally, since the payoffs u n are at most 1, (6) is less than or equal to
which itself is less than ε for N large enough. 
Player 1 uniformly guarantees
where t is taken modulo N 0 in δ t+1 . The purpose of these games is that they have the same uniform value as the Γ i 's, but ε-optimal stationary strategies instead of ε-optimal Markov N 0 -periodic strategies. Indeed, by proposition 4.6, let σ i be an ε-optimal Markov N 0 -periodic strategy in Γ i . Letμ i be the following stationary strategy in
. This defines a stationary strategy of player 1 in Γ i which is ε-optimal. Remark 4.2. Since we are dealing with Markov periodic strategies, one could think of defining maximal communicating sets with regard to this class of strategies rather than stationary strategies as in definition 4.1. However the construction we propose here appears to provide a simpler demonstration of player 1 uniformly guaranteeing w ∞ in Γ. Let S and T be the set of strategies of player 1 and 2 respectively in Γ. It is important to note that any quantity guaranteed by a player in Γ is also guaranteed in Γ.
The auxiliary game
The following lemma states that the Y component of a recurrent class in X × Y cannot have nonempty intersection with two different maximal communicating sets in Y . 
Define the stationary strategies µ and ν on X × Y by, for all (x, y) ∈ R ′ ,
and arbitrarily outside R ′ . Under (µ, ν), R ′ is a recurrent class. Hence by proposition 4.4 there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, letμ i be an ε-optimal stationary strategy of player 1 in Γ i . Define the stationary strategy µ of player 1 in Γ as follows. For all (x, y, t) ∈ X × Ỹ µ(x, y, t) = μ i (x, y, t) if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that y ∈ C i arbitrary fixed action if y ∈ D.
In the game Γ, by proposition 2.2, player 2 has a stationary strategỹ ν ∈ ∆(B) X× Y and there exists M ∈ N * such that for all N ≥ M and all
The pair (μ,ν) induces a Markov chain on X × Y with recurrent classes R 1 , . . . , R m . By lemma 4.8 there exists a mapping ψ : {1, . . . , m} → {1, . . . , L} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we define
Lemma 4.9. In the game Γ starting at (x, y, 1) ∈ X × Y , player 1 uniformly guarantees
Proof. Let N ≥ 2 and ε ′ > 0,
This last quantity is equal to
Since T i is taken less than √ N in the indicator function, the latter is greater than
Recall that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L},μ i is ε-optimal in Γ i , which has value v i ∞ . Moreover, conditionally on T i = min k∈{1,...,m} T k , from T i + 1 on, player 2 only plays actions that are in (B y ) y∈R i , otherwise the state process on Y would have a positive probability of leaving C ψ(i) and R i would not be a recurrent class. Hence for N large enough the quantity above is greater than or equal to
which, for N large enough is greater than
Hence there exists N ∈ N * such that for all N ≥ N and all τ ∈ T ,
Finally, for ε ′ small enough, the right-hand side is greater than
which concludes the proof.
To conclude, we prove that the payoff uniformly guaranteed (up to 3ε) by player 1 in Γ in lemma 4.9 can be obtained by player 2 as a limit payoff in the MDP G, and hence is greater than w ∞ , the uniform value of G. Proof. By lemma 4.9, in the game Γ starting at (x, y, 1) ∈ X × Y player 1 uniformly guarantees
In the MDP G, let τ G be the following strategy of player 2. At stage 1, playν(x, y, 1), a new state (y 2 , t 2 ) ∈ Y is selected according toq(·|y, 1,ν(x, y, 1)). At stage 2, playν(x 2 , y 2 , t 2 ) where x 2 ∈ X is selected according to p(·|x,μ(x, y, 1)).
A new state (y 3 , t 3 ) ∈ Y is selected according toq(·|y 2 , t 2 ,ν(x 2 , y 2 , t 2 )). Inductively at stage n > 2, playν(x n , y n , t n ) where x n ∈ X is selected according to p(·|x n−1 ,μ(x n−1 , y n−1 , t n−1 )).
τ G has the following interpretation. Player 2 plays in G according tõ T i = min k∈{1,...,m} T k . Hence this quantity is greater than w ∞ (y).
Since in the initial game Γ starting at (x, y), player 1 also uniformly guarantees
This is true for all ε > 0. Hence player 1 uniformly guarantees w ∞ in Γ.
Proof of theorem 3.4
In subsection 5.1 we present the weakly communicating on both sides zerosum product stochastic game used to prove theorem 3.4. The example proposed shows that in weakly communicating on both sides games, even if players can go from any state to any other state of their component in finite time, they can make mistakes that are irreversible with regards to the joint state. Subsection 5.2 is dedicated to the simplification of the Shapley equations obtained for the weakly communicating on both sides game (proposition 5.2). Finally in subsection 5.3 we show that the Shapley equations obtained after simplification are also those of a simple game of perfect information, i.e. in each state only one player control the transition, with two absorbing and two non absorbing states. The latter game does not have an asymptotic value (lemmas 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6).
A counter-example
State spaces and action sets
The state space of player 1 is X = {x, y} × C 8 where 
Transitions
For i ∈ {x, y} we denote by −i the element of {x, y}\{i}.
In state (i, k) ∈ X if player 1 plays (α, p) ∈ I × {−1, +1} then with probability 1 − α − α 2 the new state is (i, k + p), with probability α the new state is (−i, k + p), and with probability α 2 the new state is (i, k − p) (see figure 4 ).
Still in state (i, k) ∈ X, if player 1 plays (α, 0) ∈ {0, 1} × {0}, then with probability 1 − α the state remains in (i, k) and with probability α the new state is (−i, k) (see figure 5) .
Transitions for player 2 are analogous on Y . on {x, y}. And likewise for player 2.
Payoffs
the distance between player 1 and 2 on the circle C 8 . The payoff function u is defined as follows.
then u is defined by the following table:
The interpretation of the game is the following. Player 1 wants to maximize his distance to player 2 who wants to minimize his distance to player 1. If the distance between them on the circle is at most 1 or at least 3, then their positions in {x, y} and {x ′ , y ′ } do not matter. Whereas if the distance between them on the circle is equal to 2, then player 1 wants to be in x (resp. y) when player 2 is in y ′ (resp. x ′ ).
Note also that if the distance between the players is at least 3 (resp. at most 1), then player 1 (resp. player 2) can play such that the distance is always at least 3 (resp. at most 1), and this is optimal for him. Hence those joint states on X ×Y act as absorbing states with payoff 1 and 0 respectively.
Shapley equations
For p ∈ {−1, 0, +1} we denote as well p by the triplet (p −1 , p 0 , p +1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 3 with p −1 = 1 if p = −1 and p −1 = 0 otherwise, and likewise for p 0 and p +1 . We define similarly q = (q −1 , q 0 , q +1 ).
Let (i, k) ∈ X and (i ′ , k ′ ) ∈ Y be the initial states of player 1 and 2. By symmetry of the game, we only consider the cases (i, k) ∈ {(x, 0), (x, 1), (x, 2), (x, 3), (x, 4)} and (i ′ , k ′ ) ∈ {(x ′ , 0), (y ′ , 0)}. Moreover, the joint state ((i, k) ,
x λ is the value of the game, played with mixed strategies, where player 1 chooses (α, p) ∈ A and player 2 chooses (β, q) ∈ B with payoff λ
y λ is the value of the game, played with mixed strategies, where player 1 chooses (α, p) ∈ A and player 2 chooses (β, q) ∈ B with payoff (1 − λ)h(y λ , x λ , α, p, β, q).
Simplification of
The aim of this section is to simplify the expressions of x λ and y λ obtained in the previous section.
Let λ ∈ (0, 1). It is clear that x λ > 0, therefore y λ > 0 because player 1 can play (α, +1) with α > 0 in (x, x ′ , 2). Moreover player 2 can play (β, +1) with β > 0 in (x, y ′ , 2) and it is easy to check that x λ < 1.
Lemma 5.1. For all λ ∈ (0, 1) the following equations hold.
The proof of lemma 5.1 is postponed to the annex. In the next proposition, we show that x λ and y λ indeed have a rather simple expression. Proposition 5.2. For all λ ∈ (0, 1),
The proof of proposition 5.2 is postponed to the annex. Equations (10) and (11) are in fact the Shapley equations of the following game, non product, non weakly communicating on both sides, described in figure 6 . This game does not have a product state space, neither has it a weakly communicating property. This example was introduced by Renault [16] . The state space is Ω = {0, 1, 0 * , 1 * }. The action space of player 1 (resp. 2) is I (resp. J). Player 1 (resp. 2) plays in state 0 (resp. 1). The states 0 * and 1 * are absorbing. The payoff in states 0 and 0 * (resp. 1 and 1 * ) is 0 (resp. 1). 
Hence x λ − y λ goes to 0 as λ goes to 0.
Proof. Suppose that β λ ≤ 1/4, then it is easy to verify that the lemma holds. Suppose now that β λ > 1/4. Then the minimum in equation (11) is attained in 1/4. It yields
Hence λ > 1/17.
Let (λ n ) n∈N * ∈ (0, 1] N * such that λ n → 0 as n goes to +∞.
Lemma 5.4. If x λn and y
Proof. Let α λ be an optimal strategy of player 1. By equation (12) one gets
Dividing by α λ √ λ and passing to the limit yields v ≤ 1/2. 
Equality (8) is thus proved. We now consider the game starting in state (x, y ′ , 2). To prove equation 9, we show that (0, +1) is a dominant strategy of player 1, i.e. ∀(α, p) ∈ A ∀(β, q) ∈ B h(x λ , y λ , α, p, β, q) − h(x λ , y λ , 0, +1, β, q) ≤ 0.
There are again 9 cases to test, corresponding to the different values of (p, q) ∈ {−1, 0, +1} 2 . And equality (11) is proved.
